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The case of Brazilian and Chilean networks
By
Francesca Beausang
London School of Economics, UK
In the context of Brazil/Chile, this article examines ways in which
innovation policy can enhance the competitiveness of developing
countries while building on organizational innovations which ben-
efit multinational enterprises (MNEs).  After a survey of
Brazilian/Chilean innovation policy, we conclude that it has failed
to bring about linkages between firms.  One exception is provided
by a Brazilian supplier network programme - an initiative which
helps generate links between large and small firms.  However, there
is no Brazilian or Chilean programme designed to create linkages
between MNEs and local firms.  We argue that if the supplier net-
work were modified to do just this, increases in MNE and national
competitiveness would ensue.
INTRODUCTION  
In this paper we investigate how innovation policy can promote the cre-
ation and diffusion of competitiveness in the context of less developed coun-
tries (LDCs).  We describe the range of available instruments for implementing
an innovation policy for LDCs, and we focus on a key area for innovation pol-
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icy, that of network formation.  We investigate through fieldwork the nature of
Brazilian and Chilean innovation policies and we point to the insufficiencies of
these policies.  We emphasize the absence of Brazilian and Chilean innovation
policies that encourage the formation of networks between firms.  In particular,
we argue that Brazilian and Chilean multinational enterprises (MNEs) can con-
tribute to the diffusion of competitiveness from MNEs to their suppliers
through networks monitored by innovation policy.  We suggest that
Brazilian/Chilean innovation policy has a crucial role in ensuring that these net-
works are not simply profit-maximizing organizational innovations from the
perspective of the MNE, but also genuine mechanisms for competitiveness dif-
fusion. 
We test two interrelated hypotheses.  The first hypothesis is that
Brazilian/Chilean innovation policy does not succeed in increasing national
competitiveness; the second, that it does not make use of MNEs in its attempt
to increase national competitiveness.  Following the testing of these hypothe-
ses through an empirical investigation of innovation policy programmes in the
context of 17 public and private Brazilian/Chilean innovation institutes, we
conclude by suggesting that Brazilian/Chilean innovation policy tap into
Brazilian and Chilean MNEs as engines of Brazilian/Chilean competitiveness.
We put forward a supplier network programme as a mechanism to facilitate this
process.
INSTRUMENTS OF INNOVATION POLICY
Innovation and competitiveness are concepts that apply both to the nation
and the firm.  In this paper, we seek to emphasize the overlaps between the
objectives of public policy-makers and those of firm managers in relation to
these concepts.  We first define the two sets of objectives and we then identify
their overlaps.  Part of the objectives of public policy-makers is articulated
through innovation policy, whose aim is the acquisition of national competi-
tiveness.  While d’Andrea Tyson (1992) defines national competitiveness as a
nation’s ability to produce goods and services that meet the test of internation-
al competition and to ensure that its citizens enjoy a standard of living that is
both rising and sustainable, Krugman (1994:7) shows that both in an economy
with very little international trade and one with high levels of trade, “the growth
rate of living standards equals the growth rate of domestic productivity—-not
productivity relative to competitors, but simply domestic productivity” “.  We
follow Krugman’s logic and equate the competitiveness of a nation with its pro-
ductivity.  In turn, the determinants of national productivity and competitive-
ness are technological and organizational innovation.  Lucas (1998) and Romer
(1986) present economic models of competitiveness that are based on techno-
logical innovation while Best (1999), Porter (1990) and Pitelis (1998) accentu-
ate the role of managerial, resource-based and organizational innovation in
competitiveness.  This is not the place to present these models in full (see
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Beausang (2003:99-106)) for such coverage), but the key point is that national
competitiveness is largely a result of national technological and organizational
innovative efforts.     
Similarly, the objective of firm managers is to increase their firm’s com-
petitiveness.  Some traditional indicators of firm competitiveness include the
difference between average cost and the market price of the firm’s product
offering, the growth of sales, the profit/sales ratio and the profit
growth/turnover ratio.  Yet a more dynamic vision of firm competitiveness
emerges if we concentrate on the anticipated future profits of a firm: they
depend on the firm’s relative productivity and input costs and the relative
attractiveness of its product offering over time.  In this case, “the future prof-
itability of a firm may be a function of its current spending on R&D, its patent-
ing activity, or many other facets of the firm’s strategy” (McFetridge, 1995, p.
6).  It is precisely this dynamic/strategic vision of profits and competitiveness
that we emphasize here.  In particular, we highlight the role of internal and
external organizational innovation in increasing firm productivity and compet-
itiveness.  For a theoretical analysis of the relationship between internal/exter-
nal organizational innovation and firm competitiveness, see Schumpeter
(1955), Penrose (1959) and for a joint analysis of their approaches, see
Beausang (2003, pps. 64-66).  The key point here is that an important objective
of firm managers is to innovate in order to compete.
Then what is the relationship between the objectives of public policy-
makers and firm managers?  On the one hand, an important objective of poli-
cy-makers is the acquisition of national competitiveness1.  On the other hand,
firm managers seek to increase firm competitiveness and productivity, partly
through internal and external organizational innovation.  Now it is obvious that
firms cannot be innovative in the organization of their relationship with other
firms/institutions unless these firms and institutions have the minimal innova-
tive capacity that is required to engage in an innovative effort, i.e. unless the
national innovative environment is strong.  In other words, firm innovation is
enhanced by national innovation because innovation breeds innovation.  This is
due to what William Easterly (2001) calls the agglomeration economies of
innovation: a firm located in an environment devoid of innovation is unlikely
to innovate.  Consequently, the objectives of policy-makers and firm managers
coincide in the sense that both gain from increases in national innovation and
competitiveness.  
A Survey of Existing Instruments
Now that we have outlined the framework that binds competitiveness and
innovation policy, we can specify the various innovation policy instruments and
the ways in which innovation policy can best be applied in an LDC context.
There are many possible instruments that can further innovative development
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in an LDC.  Macroeconomic policies affect innovative capabilities through
interest rates, price changes, exchange rates, fiscal and monetary policies, and
foreign exchange restrictions.  The trade regime also has an impact on innova-
tive development, since world competition improves quality, introduces new
products, forces LDCs to keep up with technological progress, and offers
economies of scale.  Indeed, “industrial efficiency is a function of the efficien-
cy with which countries have utilised technologies and of the high rates of pro-
ductivity growth they have enjoyed.  Boosting capabilities implies a dynamic
technical efficiency as opposed to a static allocative efficiency.  However, out-
ward orientation does not mean the absence of selective trade and other inter-
ventions in strategic sectors for the development of an industrial base, quite the
contrary; and strategic industrial policy requires time, investment and effort”
(Lall, 1996, p. 37)2. 
Another instrument of innovation policy is skills development.  The link
between innovation policy and skill acquisition is clear: “more advanced tech-
nical training becomes critical as the industrial structure develops... The educa-
tional system has to match the skill needs of the industrial structure” (Lall,
1996:42).  Skills must be tailored to the specific needs of industry. 
Technical information and support services are other instruments of inno-
vation policy.  They exist under different forms.  Information can be gathered
through journals, contacts with capital goods suppliers, buyers of export prod-
ucts, and interactions with subcontractors.  Public infrastructure for science and
technology is the most prominent policy area concerned with the diffusion of
information.  The need for information and technical support grows with the
level of technological capability development but strengthening of the infor-
mation structure can greatly help the technological development process.  
Unfortunately, in many cases, there is no proper linkage between the pro-
motion work of institutions involved in information and technical support and
the technological needs of industry.  This is why the role of technological parks
is key to bridge these two areas.  These parks provide necessary governmental
support for industrial and communications infrastructure, and for labor training.
The experience of East Asian countries with these parks is particularly enlight-
ening.  In South Korea, the Electronics and Telecommunications Research
Institute (ETRI), which is a technological park and one of the four subsidiaries
of the Ministry of Information and Communication, has contributed to Korea’s
industrial development through the early transfer of research and development
(R&D) results.  It runs the Industrial Technology Enhancement Centre, whose
main goal is to contribute to the improvement of technology standards and to
the “Koreanization” of strategic high technology.  The flaw of the Centre’s pro-
grammes is their poor local synergy: the Centre usually has a strong tendency
to focus on national priorities in R&D instead of private company interests.
Another subsidiary of the Ministry of Information and Communication called
the Industrial Technology Research Institute has a major role in technology
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transfer.  It maintains a close relationship with private firms in its park and car-
ries out joint research projects with them.  Many of its research projects stem
from consultations with firms.  Similarly, the Technological Innovation Centre
at the Korean Advanced Institute of Science and Technology carries out indus-
try-oriented projects and facilitates technological developments in the industri-
al sector.
Alternatively, the Taiwanese government-led Hsinchu Science-Based
Industrial Park is based on another model, whereby the government only pro-
vides 50% of the park’s budget, in order to maintain a stable linkage between
its Electronics Research and Service Organization and private companies.  The
other 50% is met through service contracts and sales of technology to private
companies, as a way of contributing to the upgrading of the technological level
of Taiwan’s electronics industry.  The benefits to attract investors include a
flexible tax-free period of 5 years, a tax levy maximum of 22%, low interest
loans, duty-free imports of machinery, raw materials, fuels, services or semi-
finished products, and capitalization of the investors’ patent rights. 
Finally, because a great part of innovative capability development is
based on formal technological effort, involving long-term experimentation and
introduction of new processes that face considerable market risk, finance is
another important innovation policy instrument.  Innovation requires loans at
concessional rates, and equity participation by the lender. 
All of the above instruments help create an innovation-friendly environ-
ment, however they do not promote innovation as such.  We now turn to more
“direct” innovation policy instruments.  The main types of direct innovation
policy instruments are financial incentives, procurement, regulations on
imports of foreign technologies and foreign direct investment (FDI) (including
regulations on linkages between MNEs and local firms), and direct targeting of
specific technologies for research by the public sector.  The two essential pil-
lars are regulations on imports of technologies and FDI, and the direct target-
ing of specific technologies for research.  We will concentrate on them.
As far as control of technology imports is concerned, regulations on the
content and terms of technology transfer in developing countries have often
reduced the output of technology inflows to the detriment of the buying coun-
try, and hence hampered the growth of technological capabilities.  As Lall
claims, “firms should be left to make their own decisions on where and what to
buy in the technology market...what is critical is to get the larger policy and
incentive framework right” (Lall, 1996:47).  Regarding the technological
impact of FDI, although investors can provide access to the most modern tech-
nologies, they will only actually transfer those technologies that the host coun-
try can absorb, with its skills and capabilities.  Technological diffusion through
inward FDI is by no means a substitute for indigenous capability development.
FDI is a means of transferring the results of innovation but not necessarily the
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innovation capability itself.  Newly industrialized economies need to deepen
their technological capabilities to undertake more advanced design and devel-
opment tasks.  
A policy option therefore becomes to require of foreign investors that a
local firm have the majority or full ownership of the affiliate.  This requirement
can be backed by measures to ensure that enterprises invest in technological
capabilities and achieve international competitiveness quickly.  Another possi-
bility is to induce MNEs to shift some of their design and development work to
LDC affiliates.  The LDC itself must concentrate its efforts on making under-
lying investments in education, local science and technology infrastructures,
and on adopting a strong export orientation (Lall, 1996).  The government has
to coordinate and promote local learning in joint ventures with MNEs, as the
deliberate policy of encouraging domestic know-how with selective entry of
foreign investors can yield significant dividends for industrial development.
Beyond the promotion of joint ventures between large local firms and
MNEs, part of the government’s innovation policy mandate is to encourage the
creation of linkages between small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and
MNEs, which may enhance national technological capability.  It sometimes
occurs that MNE activity has spontaneous spillover effects on SMEs, particu-
larly human capital spillovers: for instance, employees may leave an MNE
affiliate or an SME related to it and set up new SMEs.  Best (1999:25) suggests
that MNEs contribute to skill formation in Malaysia through such spillovers3.
However, these spillovers do not always take place spontaneously, and there is
a role for the creation of linkages between MNEs and SMEs.  Indeed, on the
one hand, many SMEs, particularly in LDCs, are not able to meet the criteria to
embark on a “high road” strategy of technological upgrading, which would turn
them into attractive linkage partners for MNEs (UNCTAD, 2000:15).  On the
other hand, the external forces driving FDI determine to a large extent the lim-
its of technology diffusion through the creation of linkages: Best (1999:35)
mentions that “Singapore’s investment is heavily concentrated and in third and
fourth tier supplier firms in the Johor region with minimal technology manage-
ment capabilities; its growth is associated with the transition of the Singapore
manufacturing capabilities from mass production to automated production.”
Therefore, special government measures are required to shape the linkages
between MNEs and SMEs.  
The Malaysian government has been very effective in promoting and
shaping these linkages.  The Penang Development Corporation initiated “small
partnerships” in manufacturing among MNEs, SMEs, and government.  A case
in point is the Penang Skills Development Centre (PSDC) which is the result of
a strategic alliance between the State Government of Penang, industry members
(i.e. MNEs and local firms), and academia.  “PSDC is a one-stop human
resource development centre established in 1989 to address the shortage of suf-
ficiently skilled manpower” (UNCTAD, 2000:16).  PSDC’s training reflects the
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needs of the industry and its courses are able to figure prominently in member
companies’ annual training plans.  The PSDC bridges the gap between skills
taught in public institutions and skills required on the job.  “Such tailored skills
development training is an important factor in an SME’s ability to absorb tech-
nology and engage in continuous innovation” (UNCTAD, 2000:16).  One of the
PSDC’s most innovative programmes is the global supplier programme (GSP),
which consists of two initiatives: basic training in critical skills and linkages
with MNEs.  The Centre has developed specific programmes for getting SMEs
prepared for partnerships and MNEs have nurtured and mentored SMEs in the
GSP.  Lessons learned, according to UNCTAD (2000:17) are that the conditions
for success are the following:
• governments must act as catalysts by providing and continuously improv-
ing logistics and educational infrastructure, particularly for the develop-
ment of engineering and management skills;
• the public and private sectors, as well as academia, must work together to
create “meso” institutions, such as skill training centres, to facilitate the
transfer of technology and to achieve the capacity for continuous innova-
tion.
Innovation policy instruments are prolific.  Overall, it is the interaction of
various factors that determines the final outcome of innovation policy, not any
particular set of factors by itself.  Getting the correct incentive structure would
be of little use if the national capacity to respond to incentives were deficient.
Investing in education and technology support systems would be worthless if
the incentive structure misguided the alternative decisions of firms.  Yet, in all
aspects of technological capability development, there is a constructive role for
government policies, as we will try to show within the context of Brazil and
Chile.
Recommendations for LDC innovation policy
In order to select priority policy instruments that can promote innovation
in LDCs, we must first learn from the evolving use of instruments through time
in developed countries.  In these countries, amongst the varied innovation pol-
icy instruments described above, traditional instruments such as R&D institu-
tions and all basic research efforts have become side-lined by new instruments
in the search to stimulate the creation of efficient innovative capabilities.
Indeed, after the Second World War, “the R&D system was seen as the source
of innovations” (Freeman, 1997:29); this belief constituted the cornerstone of
the traditional approach to innovation policy, which was called the linear model
of science and technology “push”.  However, “as empirical evidence and analy-
sis began to accumulate about industrial R&D and about innovation, both in
Japan and in the United States and Europe, it became increasingly evident that
the success of innovations, their rate of diffusion and the associated productiv-
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ity gains depended on a wide variety of other influences as well as formal
R&D” (Freeman, 1997:31).  Amongst these, Freeman mentions the innovations
of the shop-floor, the improvements to products coming from interaction
between a firm and related firms, and between a firm and the narrower profes-
sional science-technology system.  Based on this developed country experi-
ence, an important characteristic of innovation policy in developing countries
should be that it involve a network building strategy.  As Meyer-Stamer (1997a)
stresses, “soft” factors have to be promoted by the diffusion of information on
new organizational concepts, and by network building both across firms and
between firms and government.  Foray and Freeman also call for a policy of
networks, based on the current production system: “in an information-intensive
production system with a multiplicity of micro markets,...the only possible
access to...diversity is through cooperation with other producers” (Foray &
Freeman, 1993:72).  With this model of innovation, the firm can access the
know-how of firms in connected areas, which increases the value of its own
human capital.  
The implications drawn from this innovation policy focus are the follow-
ing: significant public research programmes aimed at substituting for private
research must be replaced by a more catalytic type of state intervention, which
facilitates the conditions of the research learning process.  Technological part-
nership must be promoted so that each individual trajectory of specialization
becomes less risky.  On the basis of the focus of network formation, we argue
that it is possible to design effective innovation policies in developing coun-
tries.  We now explore Brazilian/Chilean innovation policy to assess how real-
istic our project is in the context of Latin American developing countries.
BRAZILIAN/CHILEAN INNOVATION POLICY
In order to gain an insight into the main innovation policies in Brazil and
Chile, we draw from the interview answers of 17 representatives of public and
private technology institutes (see tables 1 and 2 for a list of the institutes)4.
Their comments were gathered during fieldwork carried out in 1999.  For the
full text of the interview questions and their answers, please see Beausang
(2003:179-183).  After synthesizing interview responses, we consider their
implications for the theory of innovation policy.
Activities covered by technology institutions
In this subsection, based on interview answers, we examine the goals of
a broad set of Brazilian and Chilean innovation institutions, from programmes
of technological innovation of Ministries of the Economy to private technolo-
gy consultancies.  We then unveil the identity of their preferred funding recip-
ients. 
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Table 1: List of selected Brazilian technology institutions
Banco Regional de
Desenvolvimento do Rio
Grande do Sul
Regional development bank in Rio
Grande do Sul
Director
Fondo de Amparo a Pesquisa
do Rio Grande do Sul
(FAPERGS)
Public institute for the promotion
of research in Rio Grande do Sul
Director
Federacao de Industrias do Rio
Grande do Sul (FIERGS)20
Industrial federation of Rio Grande
do Sul
President
Servico Brasileiro de Apoio a
Empresas do Rio Grande do
Sul (SEBRAE RS)21
Public institute for the promotion
of small and medium enterprises
in Rio Grande do Sul
Director
Incubadora de Empresas
Tecnologicas (IETEC)22
Municipal incubator Assistant to the
president
Unisinos23 University Professor
Secretaria da C&T do Rio
Grande do Sul24
Science and technology secretariat
of Rio Grande do Sul
Director
Polo informatico da Unisinos25 Technology centre Project manager
Name Type of institute Interviewee (s)
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Table 2:  List of selected Chilean technology institutions
Parque Valle de lo Aguirre Technological park Director
Programa de Innovacion
Tecnologica (PIT)26
Technological innovation
programme of the Chilean
Ministry of the Economy
Executive director
INVERTEC27 Private consultancy in
technology management
Main consultant
Corporación de la
Madera (CORMA)
Sectoral association of pulp
and paper producers
Vice-president
Fundacion Chile28 Technology institute Project consultant; direc-
tor of wood sector proj-
ects
Centro de
Investigaciones Mineras
y Metallurgicas
(CIMM)29
Centre for research and
innovations in mining
technologies
Executive director
Corporacion de
Fomento a la
Producción (CORFO)30
National programme for
promoting manufacturing
Coordinator of supplier
networks programme;
chief of operations
department of the
National Fund for
Technological and
Productive
Development; manager
of the Fund for the
Development of
Innovation.
Name Type of institute Interviewee (s)
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The main problems to be addressed by innovation policy
One of the main goals of the institutions in our sample was the promotion
of technological diffusion between firms.  Many Chilean institutions did not
consider the lack of technological innovation in their country as a problem in
itself.  Some asserted that there was more need for diffusion than innovation,
given that the linear model of innovation had proven faulty.  It was stated that
knowledge increase via foreign technology transfer rather than indigenous
technological innovation could be an efficient means of diffusion and acquisi-
tion of technological capability.  
However, a second preoccupation was to promote the transition from
development to research within firms.  In Chile, the lack of research in firms
was seen as a problem by the INVERTEC consultancy5.  In 1995 a survey on
industrial technological innovation was administered to 541 Chilean firms.
Only one third of them reported that they made a strong effort to engage in
research (Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas & PIT del Ministerio de la
Economia, 1995).  Based on the results of this survey, the PIT identified the fol-
lowing shortcomings in the Chilean innovation system: the current inadequacy
of the financial system given the necessities of technological innovation proj-
ects, the poor development of cooperation between firms in innovative projects,
and the difficulties in the transition from the phase of R&D to its productive
applications. 
The reasons behind low levels of innovation
While some policy-makers deplored the low levels of innovation of
firms, many of them were also quite aware of the roots of the problem.  In
Brazil, we were told that there was no entrepreneurial culture of research
because of its high cost (IETEC interview, 1999).  The research deficit was also
seen as a remainder of the 1970s’ policy of import substitution industrialization,
which induced Brazilian firms to copy technology, with the result that entre-
preneurs only engaged in technological investment for a specific project, with-
out being aware of the need for continuous R&D (Ibid.).
Other institutions, both in Brazil and Chile, emphasized the fact that in
order to be innovative, firms needed to have a pre-existing capability in tech-
nological infrastructure, equipment and human resources (IETEC interview,
1999).  These minimal conditions must already exist before firms can start
innovating; of course, these conditions do not exist in most Brazilian and
Chilean firms.  Consequently, the IETEC incubator in Brazil provided most of
its grants to projects in product development, marketing and commercializa-
tion, rather than to projects in more basic innovation, because it considered the
former projects to constitute a funding priority6.  
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Yet, the project coordinator of the Fundación Chile (Moreno interview,
1999), which is a technology transfer agency, suggested a potential remedy to
the low levels of innovation.  He called for the creation of mechanisms that
generate and diffuse information between agents of innovation.  One such
mechanism consists in “soft guidance instruments”.  By soft instruments, he
meant flows of information, pooling of know-how of various actors, integration
of interests, and adoption of procedures.  These instruments involve the partic-
ipation of employers’ organizations, trade unions, associations, local adminis-
tration, technology institutes, and universities.  For Fundacion Chile’s project
coordinator, the active shaping of “soft” structures to improve Chile’s compet-
itiveness is in infancy.  The only recent improvement in this respect has been
the creation of joint marketing channels between firms.  For example, enter-
prises from the wood industry have begun to create networks for joint market-
ing (see Meyer-Stamer, 1997a).
The project coordinator insisted that these forms of cooperation among
enterprises could be cemented by institutional networks.  For example, the
Fundacion Chile has recently created “sectoral working parties” for “dynamic
enterprises”, to induce some enterprises to exchange engineers and inspect each
others’ plants in competitive cooperative structures (see also Esser & Meyer-
Stamer, 1993).  The Fundacion Chile has consolidated communication and
information structures among enterprises and between employers and experts
(through seminars on new production technologies, “round tables” for employ-
ers on technical and organizational problems at the subsectoral level, and con-
tinuous management training).  The Fundacion promotes cooperation in R&D,
specifies quality standards, and organizes joint seminars on technological prob-
lems.  According to its project coordinator, the Fundacion Chile proves how
important institutions are in the process of developing competitiveness.  Via its
arbitration, enterprises form networks with technologically innovative services,
institutions, and universities.  Unfortunately, the coordinator noted that institu-
tions such as the Fundacion Chile were very rare in Chile.  
Individual targets of innovation policy 
Given the low levels of innovation, the recipients of innovation policy
funding had to be selected all the more carefully.  Ideally, large firms were the
preferred targets of both Brazilian and Chilean policy-makers, as they had the
most resources to devote to innovation.  An INVERTEC consultant claimed
that projects developed by large firms produced three times as many benefits as
those developed by small ones in terms of output per peso invested
(INVERTEC interview, 1999).  For this consultant, the ideal innovative firm
employed four hundred people: with this number of employees, the firm did not
experience organizational inertia and carried sufficient financial weight to
engage in innovation.  The same was concluded in Brazil (IETEC interview,
1999).  The FIERGS representative, in Brazil, noticed that large firms had a
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role to play as industrial leaders, particularly in a globalized world (FIERGS
interview, 1999).  According to him, when Brazilian SMEs attempt to sell their
products to the US, for instance, they do not have the means to commercialize
or compete; hence the need for them to rely on larger firms for commercializa-
tion.  Therefore, he found that large firms had to be key policy targets, on the
basis of their spillover to the rest of the economy.  
Whereas large firms were often identified, at least in principle, as key
policy targets, MNEs in particular were not drawn into the national innovation
project: the representatives of CORFO (Silva interview, 1999) and the Brazilian
Rio Grande do Sul Bank for Regional Development (Bonzoni interview, 1999)
mentioned that their institutions did not want to place any limitations on the
free agency of MNEs, by forcing them to diffuse their innovative capabilities
to other firms.  They argued that such requirements would “distort” investment
decisions.  Indeed, this prevailing attitude in the sphere of Brazilian and
Chilean innovation policy is consistent with the nature of these countries’
investment policy.  As argued by Chudnovsky & Lopez (2000a, p. 18), the
Brazilian and Chilean governments have been so keen to attract MNEs at all
costs that they have rarely placed any requirements or set up incentives towards
their contribution to local innovative capability.  They argue that the structure
of investment incentives implemented in these countries has not reflected the
possibility that, in addition to benefiting from the investments themselves, host
countries could benefit more directly from externalities and spillovers via local
subsidiaries’ undertaking of innovative activities, training of human resources,
or supplier development.  This is all the more surprising given that the World
Trade Organization does not prohibit the application of incentives destined to
R&D activities or personnel training.  Although on the one hand, some incen-
tives have been granted to investments which were meant to lead to significant
export flows, on the other hand, competitiveness improvement and restructur-
ing of local suppliers have not been consistent policy objectives.  The absence
of such objectives has limited the generation of backward linkages from pro-
moted investments in Brazil and Chile.
In fact, the representative of the Brazilian Rio Grande do Sul Bank for
Regional Development (Bonzoni interview, 1999) noted that the current recip-
ients of its funding were neither large firms, nor MNEs, but SMEs, supposedly
because of the difficulties involved in influencing the strategies of the other two
categories of firms.  In addition, for the IETEC representatives (IETEC inter-
view, 1999), large Brazilian firms do research in-house, as opposed to US ones,
which subcontract SMEs to make technological breakthroughs for them.  For
these representatives, the in-house technological activity of large Brazilian
firms does not allow any scope for technological diffusion.  Nonetheless,
because IETEC does not have an important capacity for product commercial-
ization, its director is attempting to form alliances between its incubated firms
and large firms by advertising them as an inexpensive source of technological
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development for large firms.  The Conselho Regional de Engheniaria e
Agronomia or Regional Council of Engineering and Agronomy informs engi-
neers from large firms of the existence of incubator SME services.  Both par-
ties share an interest in cooperation: the large firm can specialize in its core
competencies, the small one can access the market and commercialize its inno-
vations via the large firm.  However, to date, IETEC’s success in appealing to
large firms has been limited.
So far, we have examined innovation policies which focus on particular
actors, such as single firms.  However, some of the most interesting innovation
policy programes in Brazil and Chile at the moment are the few programmes
which attempt to build on external networks between firms.  We now turn to an
investigation of these programmes. 
A recent initiative in Brazilian and Chilean innovation policy:
the supplier network programme
One such programme is the Programa de Desarrollo de Proveedores (in
Chile)/Programa de Capacitacao de Fornecedores (in Brazil), or Supplier
Network Programme.  Henceforth we will refer to it as PDP.  A PDP is a pro-
gramme in which a supplier is subcontracted by a core firm for an extended
period of time (from two to three years) under the direct supervision of a gov-
ernmental agency (Servico Brasileiro de Apoio a Empresas or Brazilian Service
of Support to Firms (SEBRAE) in Brazil and Corporacion de Fomento a la
Produccion (CORFO) in Chile).  The purpose of the PDP is to monitor the core
firm’s transfer of technology and management practices to the suppliers.  From
our viewpoint, PDPs are interesting because they contribute to the objective of
competitiveness diffusion between firms.  As we mentioned, these programmes
have been a feature of East Asian innovation policies for some time, but are a
very recent addition to Latin American innovation policy.  
The PDP is not a spontaneous development but rather an artificial, poli-
cy-induced creation of relationships between a core firm and SME suppliers.
Hence, it requires the intervention of a third actor, i.e. a government agency,
whose role is to monitor the competitiveness spillovers of the core firm.  This
intervention can be crucial because the core firm often conducts most stages of
its production process in-house or buys services in the market—-therefore it
must be induced by a governmental agency to delegate particular production
activities to its suppliers.
But what profit can the core firm derive from the PDP?  A core firm
requires constant supply and competitive prices from its suppliers.  Its goal is
to improve efficiency, decrease defect rates, increase quality control, and opti-
mize productive processes.  Towards this goal, the core firm can transfer its
managerial practices so that the small one can produce a higher quantity of out-
put per unit, or transfer its technology so that the small one can produce at a
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lower cost via the reduction of its labor force7.  Therefore, the main interest of
the PDP for the core firm is that with improved quality from suppliers, it can
reduce the costs of its operational and productive processes (SEBRAE, 1999).
The result of the programme for the core firm is more competitiveness,
economies of scale, bigger negotiation power, and more information for deci-
sion-making.
Moreover, to understand the appeal of the PDP, we have to consider the
alternative options available to the core firm.  Assuming that a core firm has
decided to externalize part of its production8, there are two ways for it to organ-
ize its supplier relations: either the core firm and its suppliers are integrated by
a policy partnership via the PDP (whereby the core firm buys from a small
number of suppliers, and builds long-term, cooperative relationships with those
few suppliers) or they are involved in subcontracting arm’s length relationships
through the market (whereby the core firm buys inputs from outside using a
number of short-term suppliers and shops for the best price each time it requires
an input).  
To understand why a core firm prefers PDP partnership supplier relations,
we first need to examine why some firms resort to arm’s length subcontracting
relations.  Dyer (2000) notes that when inputs are highly standardized, or do not
involve transaction-specific assets, firms use subcontracting arm’s length rela-
tionships with outside suppliers who can specialize and achieve economies of
scale.  For him, arm’s length relationships have appeal because they are simple
and easily managed: they only involve minimal information exchange, the lev-
els of interdependence between the technological and functional systems with-
in each firm are low, and the need for trust is also low because neither party is
vulnerable and switching costs are low.  All these characteristics imply that a
consumer’s relationship with his set of suppliers can be replicated easily with
any other set of suppliers.
Then what determines a firm’s choice between arm’s length subcontract-
ing and PDP partnerships?  As it happens, the strength of arm’s length rela-
tionships, i.e. their simplicity, is also their major weakness: they are “incapable
of generating [competitive] advantage because there is nothing idiosyncratic
about the exchange relationship that enables the two parties to generate profits
above and beyond what other seller-buyer combinations can generate” (Dyer,
2000, p. 37).  Hence, when transactors choose to create value and competitive
advantage through investments enhancing the productivity both of the con-
sumer and of a set of long-term suppliers, i.e. investments in dedicated assets9,
partnerships are preferable to arm’s length relationships, as the latter do not
even consider a particular consumer-supplier combination as the source of
competitive advantage.  As explained by Dyer (2000), “when deciding
[between organizational forms], managers must wrestle with a fundamental
dilemma: productivity grows with the division of labor, thereby creating an
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incentive to outsource activities to more specialized firms, but specialization
increases the costs of communication and coordination of activities, thereby
creating an incentive to bring activities in-house to manage under a common
hierarchical structure” (p. 25).  To a large extent, partnerships offer a moderate
compromise between specialization and coordination.  In particular, it was clear
from our fieldwork interviews in Brazil that the PDP was preferred for this rea-
son.  We were told that it allowed for the maintenance of specialized yet stable
relations, which therefore facilitated their coordination, while arm’s length sub-
contracting was perceived as a temporary means of specialization without coor-
dination. 
To examine the extent of stability and coordination provided by PDPs, we
now turn to the case study of a Brazilian PDP. 
Case study of a Brazilian PDP
At the SEBRAE, an agency which is represented both at the national and
the local levels, a PDP was designed in 199310.  The PDP process is divided in
the following stages.  The SEBRAE finds a core firm, verifies its interest in the
programme, investigates whether it has a series of existing suppliers or not, and
encourages it to select the firms it would be willing to train.  The demanding
entity must be the core firm.  Training revolves around issues of quality, pro-
ductivity, management, technology, and human resource (HR) management11.
The SEBRAE has implemented PDPs in the shoe, metal and furniture sectors.
Two PDPs have been carried out in the shoe sector of the Vale dos Sinos
in Rio Grande do Sul (RS), where fieldwork was conducted; the two demand-
ing firms were Artecola and Simpatia.  One of the Sinos programmes was set
up by the SEBRAE of RS in conjunction with the Associacao Comercial
Industrial e de Servicos de Novo Hamburgo (ACI-NH) or Commercial,
Industrial and Service Association of Novo Hamburgo, the Centro Tecnologico
de Couro, Calcados e Afins (CTCCA) or Technological Centre for Leather,
Shoes and Components, and Artecola Industrias Quimicas as the demanding
firm (the second programme involved the same actors and workings, except
that the demanding firm was called Simpatia).  The SEBRAE supported the
demanding firm in the execution of projects and training of suppliers, with an
emphasis on total quality management.  The ACI-NH promoted the linkages
between the SEBRAE and the leather-shoe complex.  The CTCCA carried out
the technical coordination of the project and contributed to its development
with technical resources.  It participated in the project through monthly hours
of technical training and through its labs.  In conjunction with the other partic-
ipants, Artecola chose its supplier firms, and elaborated a programme of sub-
contracting and development of suppliers, establishing priorities as to products
and services to be delivered.  It stimulated the adoption of modern management
methods by small suppliers, promoted their technological upgrading, and estab-
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lished long-term contracts with them.  Artecola supported training activities via
its consulting services, HR and materials.  60% of project expenses were
financed by the National SEBRAE, 10% by the regional RS SEBRAE, 20% by
Artecola, 5% by the SMEs, and 5% by the ACI-NH (SEBRAE, 1999).      
Sixtythree SMEs received management and technology training from
Artecola.  The sequence of the programme was as follows: definition of poli-
cies with suppliers, visit of consultants to Artecola, visit of Artecola to suppli-
ers, seminars with suppliers, visits of suppliers to Artecola by group and divi-
sion, diagnosis of suppliers and compilation of performance indicators, elabo-
ration of plan of action, courses, consulting, technical training, and final diag-
nosis.  There were 15 hours of seminars, 536 hours of classes, 298 hours of
training and 800 hours of consulting.  Courses included the following: intro-
ductory seminar to total quality management, five senses course, analysis
methodology, statistical processing, production planning, participatory groups,
leadership, just-in-time (JIT) and cost analysis for SMEs. 
The managerial profile of supplier firms
Having explained the functioning of the programme, we need to describe
the nature of the supplier firms participating in it, and their initial managerial
profile.  We gained an insight into their profile by accessing data from the
Simpatia PDP record held by SEBRAE (which involved 51 SMEs).  The con-
sultants’ initial assessment of the suppliers was rather negative.  80.4% of the
supplier firms did not possess an organization chart (SEBRAE, 1999).  19.6%
of them declared they had a strategic plan, which was not confirmed in 5 cases
by other SEBRAE questionnaire responses.  In financial terms, 43.1% of the
firms declared they were in an unstable position.  56.9% of the firms did not
possess a structure or system of cost analysis.  Only 6 firms had an activity ori-
ented towards quality systems.  Only one firm was implementing JIT.  82.3%
of the firms did not have a clearly defined HR policy.  
These data (which are representative of the majority of Sinos shoe sector
SMEs, according to SEBRAE) explain why the priority of PDPs in Brazil so far
has not been technological training, but other areas such as management, com-
mercialization and finance.  It does seem logical to address basic problems
before complex ones12. 
What were the core firms expecting from the programme?
Given the poor performance of supplier SMEs, one might wonder why
core firms would want to engage in a network with them.  The motivations of
the two demanding firms involved in PDPs in the Vale dos Sinos were varied.
Artecola, for instance, was “hoping to stimulate the practice of industrial sub-
contracting through the creation of conditions for the establishment of a tech-
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nical and management standard that would be common to [its] small-sized sup-
pliers” (SEBRAE, 1999, p. 15).  Homogeneity and stability in supply were
therefore important advantages offered by the programme.  The viewpoint of
the manager of Simpatia, which was the other firm involved in a PDP in the
Vale, was different.  He was more interested in strengthening his firm’s core
competencies: “the global economy is moving towards the fragmentation of
mega-industries into large and medium-sized ones and this tendency causes
large firms to stimulate small ones, and the specialization of business is part of
this market rule” (SEBRAE, 1999, p. 13).
How did the participants evaluate the programme?
Now that we have clarified the expectations of demanding firms before
they became involved in PDPs, the next issue we need to address is how they
subsequently evaluated these programmes.  The director of Artecola stated that
the PDP considerably improved the process of evaluation and certification of
suppliers, the quality of their supply in terms of delivery and quality, as well as
their services and defect resolution.  The manager of Simpatia cast the follow-
ing judgment on the PDP: through the creation of a network between Simpatia
and its suppliers of sole components, the suppliers’ sequential production struc-
ture became organized into cells, the management skills of suppliers improved,
more supplier flexibility allowed for a quicker change of models within
Simpatia, controls became less necessary, the indirect labor force used to con-
trol defects was reduced, and so were stocks (SEBRAE, 1999).  These judg-
ments point to the fact that both small and core firms derived benefits from
PDPs.  On the whole, they can be grouped under the category of “stability ben-
efits”, as suggested by the literature. 
Conclusion
Based on the above panorama of Brazilian and Chilean innovation poli-
cies, it is clear that even if policy-makers are increasingly acknowledging the
importance of linkages between different firms, they ignore the linkages of
MNEs in particular and focus their attention on those of indigenous core firms
in general.  We would like to make a case for national innovation policies to
stimulate the creation of networks centred around MNEs, yet this requires a
complete rethinking of the Brazilian and Chilean national systems of innova-
tion (NSIs)13.  Below, we suggest reasons why national innovation policy could
gain from targeting MNEs as opposed to indigenous core firms in general, and
we examine the specificities of MNE-led supplier networks.
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BRIDGING MNE AND POLICY STRATEGIES:
SUGGESTIONS FOR AN IMPROVED SUPPLIER
NETWORK PROGRAMME
We argue that for Brazilian and Chilean PDPs to achieve their full poten-
tial, they would have to make use of MNEs instead of indigenous core firms,
which are currently at the centre of PDPs.  On the one hand, we have already
reviewed the evidence on Brazilian PDPs organized around indigenous core
firms, and we concluded that they had succeeded in diffusing competitiveness.
On the other hand, there is ample evidence in the literature, and we will show
below that most MNEs are competitive firms, given their privileged access to
two key sources of competitiveness, i.e. technological and organizational inno-
vation14.  Therefore, we suggest that Brazilian and Chilean PDPs could use
MNEs and diffuse their competitiveness.  
This usage of MNEs would be a novelty in the Brazilian and Chilean con-
text.  Indeed, MNEs are not targeted by current Brazilian or Chilean innovation
policies, including PDPs.  But we do not consider this to be a problem for our
research: while the absence of MNEs from existing PDPs is unfortunate, it only
reinforces our point that Brazilian and Chilean innovation policy ignores the
potential of MNEs.  We suggest that this is a mistake.  However, we still have
a lot to learn from existing PDPs between indigenous core firms and their sup-
pliers.  A priori, there is no reason why the beneficial results of these PDPs
should not apply to PDPs involving a multinational core firm.  In other words,
we suggest that the MNE is a good candidate to undertake a PDP, but we make
use of the PDP evidence that exists, which only involves indigenous core firms,
to evaluate the performance of this kind of programme in the transfer of tech-
nology and best practice management.  
There are two advantages in an innovation policy of supplier networks
creation involving MNEs in particular.  On the one hand it builds upon an MNE
strategy: indeed, one of the sources of competitiveness of the MNE is a strong
external network15.  On the other hand, as we showed above, network-building
has become a key aspect of innovation policy.  Therefore, an external network
(such as the supplier network) can be the meeting point between an MNE strat-
egy and a policy strategy.  External networks can be shaped both by MNEs and
innovation policy.  Hence our double goal of identifying the conditions under
which an external network between an MNE and its suppliers benefits first the
MNE, and second some targets of innovation policy, i.e. suppliers.
The rationale of PDPs for MNEs
While we covered the benefits of PDPs for core firms in general in the
preceding section, we now focus on the conditions under which PDPs benefit
MNEs in particular and on the attributes that MNEs must possess to engage in
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such networks.  Regarding the above-mentioned conditions, it is interesting that
some researchers have suggested that MNEs would prefer to retain linkages
overseas (with their parent or globally), rather than undertake the extra costs of
developing local suppliers (Hill, 1985).  Thee (1985) goes so far as to argue that
MNEs subcontract locally only under government pressure.  In practice, how-
ever, an MNE’s decision to set up a supplier network is determined by the exis-
tence/capability of local suppliers and the capability of the MNE to maintain
overseas networks.  We choose to concentrate on the MNE’s capability to main-
tain overseas networks, as we are particularly interested in the attributes of the
MNE itself in this section, as opposed to those of its suppliers16.
The capability of the MNE to maintain an overseas network is itself relat-
ed to the trade potential between the MNE’s home and host countries as well as
the MNE’s size.  Together, these two factors constitute the MNE’s “economic
base” for networking.  Let us begin with trade potential.  For a full expose of
the relationship between trade potential and supplier networks, see Markusen
(1983).  In a nutshell, there are two sides to this relationship.  One aspect of the
relationship has to do with the MNE’s specific level of export-intensity: the
more export-intensive the MNE, the higher the quality and the more specialized
the inputs required to be competitive in world markets, the lower the MNE’s
reliance on local suppliers.  The other aspect of the relationship is related to
national trade flows: the more trade potential there is between an MNE’s home
and host countries, the more justification there is for the establishment of a sup-
plier network.  
How does this apply to our context of analysis?  On the first aspect,
Chudnovsky & Lopez (1999) show that Brazilian/Chilean MNEs are not high-
ly export-intensive, as they seek primarily to compete in their host countries,
hence the justification for the establishment of networks.  On the second aspect,
it has been shown elsewhere (Beausang, 2003) that Brazilian/Chilean foreign
direct investment is not a substitute for trade; in fact, Chudnovsky & Lopez
(1999) have argued that such capital flows emerged as a response to the oppor-
tunity opened up by the creation of the Mercosur trading block between Brazil,
Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay (plus Chile, Bolivia and Peru), and has
ended up complementing the trade flows between Mercosur members.  Hence
the rationale for supplier network creation.
A second determinant of an MNE’s capability to maintain overseas net-
works is its size, as it influences the MNE’s competitive advantage.  In the con-
text of Taiwanese host country supplier networks, Chen (1998) shows that the
impact of firm size on the capability to maintain an overseas network varies
across time.  He compares the sourcing strategies of Taiwanese affiliates estab-
lished before 1990 with those established after 1990 and he finds that in the
long-run, affiliates of small and medium-sized MNEs offer a stronger local
linkage because of what he calls the pressure to localize.  Such pressure comes
from the MNE’s inability to tap into international resources and from a gradual
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reduction in the support it receives from its parent firm.  However, in the short-
run, he finds that affiliates of large MNEs source more materials locally
because of economies of scale in local procurement.  Yet in the long-run, these
affiliates use standardized components and parts that enable alternative sourc-
ing from the outside world: therefore, they pursue a globalization strategy with
worldwide suppliers.  That is, they engage in global, not local sourcing.
Although Chen’s findings are specific to the context he is looking at,
there is a lot to be learned from them in terms of the attributes required of
MNEs considering an involvement in local supplier networks.  In fact, the part
of his findings that is generalizable is their implication for the attributes that are
not required.  Indeed, the interesting point about Chen’s small and medium-
sized MNEs is that they are weak organizations from the perspective of a firm-
specific advantage but they are linked by strong networks17.  From this per-
spective, there does not have to be a strong competitive advantage to justify the
creation of local supplier networks, in fact, it is the weakening of an MNE’s
competitive advantage that justifies their creation, as an opportunity to take
advantage of assets accummulated locally18.
At this point, we must introduce a note of caution: “competitive disad-
vantage”, as Porter would call it, can only take an MNE so far.  Realistically, it
cannot be seen as a sufficient base to justify the creation of a local supplier net-
work.  Chen’s small and medium-sized MNEs were largely able to develop
local supplier networks because they possessed a “cultural base” for network-
ing, which offset their insufficient “economic base” or more precisely their
insufficient competitive advantage.  This cultural base consisted in the pre-
existing ethnic linkages between Taiwanese entrepreneurs and the Chinese
diaspora present in host countries.  It is in this respect that Chen’s findings on
Taiwanese MNEs are very context-specific.  
Yet while we need to keep Taiwanese idiosyncrasies in mind, Chen’s data
does provide us with some evidence that a strong competitive advantage is not
a pre-requisite for an MNE’s involvement with supplier networks.
Furthermore, in the case of MNEs with a weak advantage that are willing to
establish a network, it makes all the more sense for the state to facilitate the
process in the context of a PDP by providing the necessary training and moni-
toring facilities.  Overall, our main point remains that the dynamics of compet-
itiveness articulate MNEs and supplier firms through the innovation system.
This articulation can take place through a two-phased mechanism:
A/Accelerated rate of innovation of MNEs via multinationalization
B/Diffusion of innovation from MNEs to suppliers and integration
of the MNE into the NSI.
It is not because the MNE has subsidiaries that transcend the national that
the NSI should not profit from the feedback of the MNE’s enlarged scale of
operation.  It makes sense to diffuse the benefits of multinationalization
Journal of Comparative International Management    6:2
24
throughout the value chain.  Suppliers do not benefit at the expense of the MNE;
rather, the PDP is best seen as an exchange between reduced costs to the MNE
and a “backward” technology and/or management transfer to suppliers.  The
objective is technology and/or management diffusion versus cost reduction19.
Why is the MNE an ideal target for policy?
We have already shown why the absence of involvement of MNEs in
PDPs could be detrimental to the MNE.  But exactly why should policy-mak-
ers choose the MNE as a vehicle for the PDP?  One of the basic flaws of PDPs
so far is that they have not really incorporated a technology dimension, partic-
ularly in Brazil.  The MNE is precisely amongst the most dynamic technology
actors in developing country economies, therefore if it were to be included in
the PDP, it would be a useful source of technology and hence competitiveness.
Moreover, the particularity of the MNE is that it is located in different coun-
tries, once again taking advantage of different NSIs and, through a feedback
mechanism, integrating them into its innovation capability.  This particular
characteristic of the MNE gives it a crucial role in the NSI, it places it at the
avant-garde of technology at the national level, since it has access to more
knowledge than an indigenous firm does.  By exposure to this cross-border
technological pool, an MNE that is involved in a PDP could give its suppliers
access to the most dynamic and developed aspects of technology, in addition to
those of organizational innovation.  
In light of the positive impact of supplier networks on the NSI as well as
on the MNE itself, the first task of policy-makers is to awaken MNEs to the
benefits that can be gained from PDPs.  A lot of work needs to be done in this
area, probably more so in Chile than in Brazil.  Although we have argued that
MNEs have a lot to gain from a PDP, MNEs are still inclined to ignore its
virtues and focus on its disadvantages.  As suggested by transaction costs the-
ory, the presence of environmental and human factors, such as uncertainty, lim-
ited rationality and opportunism, renders rather unattractive the investments
that an MNE would have to make to construct and consolidate a trustworthy
supplier network that complements its specific competitive advantage (Peres
Nunes, 1998).  In fact, in normal conditions, such investments are costly, have
a high probability of failure and are scarcely appropriable.  In such a context,
the action of public policies that try to eliminate the inertia of conduct based on
distrust is justified (but currently still at the stage of infancy), in order to dimin-
ish the risks of opportunism and consolidate new work practices that support
the profitability of efficient productive articulations.
Various measures can be taken by policy-makers to induce MNEs to par-
ticipate in a PDP.  These measures strive to increase the efficiency of the PDP,
and thereby render it “attractive” to MNEs.  The following elements could be
useful in attaining this objective:
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i) Reform of legal and administrative aspects that regulate supplier and
technical assistance contracts between firms.  Legal instruments must be
adequate for the promotion and regulation of subcontracting mecha-
nisms.
ii) Constitution of a network of private institutions which would promote
articulations between suppliers and MNEs, with public support.  The
strategic orientation of MNEs would be to strengthen and develop firm
networks as a key element for competitiveness increases.  As far as pub-
lic support is concerned, SEBRAE and CORFO (particularly SEBRAE)
need to establish a new focus on technology transfer in addition to their
present focus on management transfer.
iii) Creation of adequate instruments to take these programmes to their term,
with due consideration of the contexts of technical assistance, technolo-
gy transfer, training, and financing.  Sectoral associations like the
ACI/NH in the Vale dos Sinos and the CTCCA could have a key role in
monitoring these activities.
Besides awakening MNEs to the benefits of PDPs, the second task of pol-
icy-makers is to ensure that these benefits do not solely flow to MNEs with
high market and bargaining power: even if MNEs were convinced of the mer-
its of supplier networks, they might attempt to draw all the benefits of the net-
work, i.e. quality increases and cost savings, without providing equal benefits
to suppliers.  There is no certainty that suppliers will receive an equitable trans-
fer of technology and managerial best practices from MNEs, if policy is not
monitoring the transfer process.  The role of policy is to ensure that the bene-
fits of the network are distributed equally between the MNEs and their suppli-
ers.
CONCLUSION
The empirical evidence provided by 17 public and private
Brazilian/Chilean innovation institutes formed the basis in this article for an
attempt to define and extend the scope of innovation policy theory in a
Brazilian/Chilean context.  This institutional evidence provided support for
both the hypotheses that Brazilian/Chilean innovation policy does not succeed
in enhancing Brazilian/Chilean competitiveness and that MNEs are not includ-
ed in current innovation policies.  
In focusing on this approach, consideration was given to detailing the
crucial role of networks as a common factor in possible corporate and innova-
tion policy initiatives.  As an example of external network promotion by inno-
vation policy, we considered the case of the supplier network programme
(PDP).  To date, in Brazil and Chile, this programme has incorporated indige-
nous core firms and the evidence on existing PDPs involving such firms sup-
Journal of Comparative International Management    6:2
26
ports the hypothesis that PDPs generate national competitiveness increases
through the transfer of technology and management from core firms to their
suppliers.  
Yet because the overall argument for redefining and improving innova-
tion policy was pursued in conjunction with a concentration on the links
between MNEs in particular and competitiveness, this led us to consider
whether MNEs could play a major role in raising competitiveness levels in both
Brazil/Chile and how innovation policy could facilitate this process.  In this
perspective, we suggested that MNE-led PDPs could be a useful policy inno-
vation.  We analyzed the case for MNE-led PDPs and our conclusion was that
they could be catalysts of technology and management transfer from MNEs to
their suppliers.  
While this paper has focused on the effects of innovation policy pro-
grammes in the particular case of supplier networks, further research could
examine other types of inter-firm network promotion.  Brazilian and Chilean
innovation policy bodies are creating funding opportunities for general inter-
firm agreements as well.  It would be of interest to research the local competi-
tiveness effects of promoting inter-firm agreements between Brazilian/Chilean
MNEs and other firms, as opposed to just analyzing those of supplier networks
in particular. 
NOTES
1 Interestingly, it is clear that the major constraint on national competitiveness consists in
the limits of territoriality: national competitiveness is constrained by the nation’s single
pool of concentrated resources.  Yet nations could overcome this constraint if they could
draw from the expanded resources of firms that are not restricted to the national territo-
ry, thereby enhancing national competitiveness.  More on this later.
2 Indeed, economic development requires a coherent set of different policies, all informed
by the continuity of one focused strategy oriented towards the development goal.
Ideally, one should be able to see the common thread of development policy cutting
across industrial, competition, and innovation policies.  Of course, this implies previous
agreement on the essence of the development goal.  We argue that the acquisition of
competitiveness could be a good proxy of the development goal.
3 “Many of the large American and Japanese companies invest continuously in shop-floor
skills.  In fact, the “invisible college” of company skill formation is considerable in
Penang” (ibid., p. 25).  Best mentions the case of Hitachi’s use of small group activity
in Penang which has facilitated the “transfer” of skills to the local industry .
4 In Chile, all of the interviews were conducted in national level public institutes and pri-
vate institutes.   In Brazil, problems of access forced us to concentrate on state level
institutes for our interviews, which we conducted in the state of Rio Grande do Sul (RS).
Together with the state of Sao Paulo, RS is the manufacturing and business centre of
Brazil.  It is mainly peopled by Brazilians of German descent.  Local industries include
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wine, ladies’ shoes, textiles, steel, electronics and electric goods. 
5 For one of its consultants, the most innovative sectors in Chile were telecommunica-
tions, mining, genetics, fisheries, biotechnology, while according to the Chilean pro-
gramme of technological innovation (PIT), these were forestry for pine and eucalyptus,
microelectronics, and fruit.   
6 However, the IETEC constitutes an exception with respect to the profile of its firms in
that the entrepreneurs that apply to participate in the incubator already have a high
degree of scientific and technological knowledge, come from scientific university
departments and hence need commercialization rather than innovation opportunities.
7 Indeed, technology is at least as important as organizational innovations for the success
of the PDP (Eduardo Silva interview, 1999).
8 That is, it has rejected the option of vertical integration/hierarchy, whereby the firm pro-
duces the required input in-house and maintains control over both the sourcing unit and
the buying unit.  Vertical integration is preferred when inputs must be highly customized
because the buyer reduces the transaction costs associated with bargaining over the prof-
its generated in a customized exchange.
9 “Dedicated assets are investments in factories, equipment, processes, and people that are
customized to a particular customer or supplier.  These investments improve the pro-
ductivity of the network and the speed with which the network can coordinate in devel-
oping unique products” (Dyer, 2000:37).
10 In this section, we focus on evidence on the Brazilian PDP.  However, there also exists
a PDP in Chile.  In Chile, the PDP is only a three-year-old pilot programme.  Over the
years, the programme has slightly changed.  When the programme was set up, all firms
were from the agro-industrial sector.  In 2000, 700 Million pesos went to the agro-indus-
try, and 200 Million were allocated to manufacturing.  While only 18 core firms partic-
ipated in the programme in 1999, it now involves 16 core firms with 1688 SMEs.  Only
2 firms have asked for contract renewal.  Indeed, the relationship with suppliers often
proceeds spontaneously after the first year of the programme, without the need for a pol-
icy push.  In Chile, the PDP functions through agents, i.e. non-profit organizations, or
sectoral associations.  The PDP funds are sent to them.  The agents structure the plan of
the programme and present it to CORFO.  The SMEs make their interest in the PDP
known to the agents but at the same time, the agents try to stimulate the core firms.
There is no direct relationship between the SMEs and the core firms; they both have to
go through the agents.  
11 In the Brazilian programme, technology and product innovation are not the main foci.
The programme mainly concerns management innovation, which according to many is
the urgent problem faced by Brazilian firms.   
12 Moreover, on the supply side, “[core firms] are more willing to transfer knowledge
about management than about technology” (UNCTAD, 2000, p. 8).  
13 Innovation systems can be defined as networks of agents and sets of policies and insti-
tutions that affect the introduction of new technology to the economy, sets of public and
private institutions and organizations that fund and perform R&D, translate results of
such activities into commercial innovations, and affect the diffusion of technologies
within the economy.
14 See for instance Hedlund (1986) and Dunning (1995).
15 See Dunning (1995), Hedlund (1986), and Zanfei (2000).
16 For a token description of the capability of local suppliers, see section 3.3.2.
17 This is all the more relevant to our analysis because Chilean MNEs tend to be medium-
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sized.
18 This approach is rooted in a particular conception of foreign direct investment, where-
by it is motivated by the quest for a specific advantage instead of being the result of the
possession of such advantages (Chen, 1998, p. 6). 
19 Interview with Mr. Klauch, export agent, Novo Hamburgo, 1999.
20 www.poa.fiergs.org.br
21 www.sebrae-rs.com.br
22 www.prefpoa.com.br
23 www.unisinos.tche.br
24 www.sct.rs.gov.br
25 www.unisinos.tche.br
26 www.innovacion.cl
27 www.invertec.cl
28 www.fundch.cl
29 www.cimm.cl
30 www.corfo.cl
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